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It has been proposed that the negative
association between wives’ earnings and their
time in housework is due to greater outsourcing
of household labor by households with high-
earning wives, but this hypothesis has not
been tested directly. In a sample of dual-
earner married couples in the Consumption
and Activities Mail Survey of the Health
and Retirement Study (N = 796), use of
market substitutes for women’s housework
was found to be only weakly associated with
wives’ time cooking and cleaning. Furthermore,
expenditures on market substitutes explain less
than 15% of the earnings – housework time
relationship. This suggests that use of market
substitutes plays a smaller role in explaining
variation in wives’ time in household labor than
has previously been hypothesized.
Wives continue to spend more time than their
husbands doing housework, even when both
spouses work full time (Kamo, 1988; Killewald
& Gough, 2010). For those couples, domestic
labor is a source of gender stratification, as
it contributes to unequal leisure time between
spouses. Furthermore, wives’ time in housework
is negatively associated with wages, thus making
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women’s greater domestic burden a contributor
to the gender gap in wages (Hersch & Stratton,
1997; Noonan, 2001).
It is therefore natural to ask what resources
wives may use to reduce their time in household
labor. Existing studies indicate that wives’
earnings are negatively associated with their
time in housework, even after controlling for
time spent in market work (Gupta, 2006,
2007; Killewald & Gough, 2010). Given that
wives’ earnings are positively associated with
household expenditures on market substitutes for
their household labor and negatively associated
with their time in housework, it has been
hypothesized that wives’ earnings allow them to
outsource household production (Cohen, 1998;
de Ruijter, Treas, & Cohen, 2005; Gupta, 2006,
2007; Gupta & Ash, 2008): Wives use their
earnings to buy out of time in housework.
Nevertheless, the explanatory power of the
buying-out hypothesis has, to my knowledge,
never been directly tested. An alternative
cause of the negative earnings – housework
relationship is that higher earnings lead wives
to reduce their household labor hours, without
purchasing a market substitute for their own
time. In other words, high earners opt out by
doing less housework.
Testing the buying-out hypothesis has been
difficult because most data sets do not include
information on both housework time and
household expenditures. Brines (1994), using
data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID), found that expenditure on dining
out relative to food consumed at home
was negatively associated with wives’ time
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in housework, but the PSID lacks data on
expenditures on other types of market substitutes
for housework. By linking time use and
expenditure measures from the Consumption
and Activities Mail Survey (CAMS) to earnings
measures from its parent study, the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS), I directly measured
the extent to which use of market substitutes
is associated with wives’ time in household
labor. Furthermore, by comparing the results of
models of wives’ housework time before and
after the inclusion of a measure of use of market
substitutes, I measured the extent to which the
expenditures explain the negative relationship
between wives’ earnings and their housework
time.
Understanding whether wives’ earnings
lessen the time they spend in household labor
primarily by increasing spending on market
substitutes has implications for understanding
the intersection between household responsi-
bilities and market work. Acknowledging that
wives may not fully compensate for their
reduced housework time by increased use of
market substitutes introduces a new parameter
into the household decision-making model: the
level of household production. Households make
choices about, for example, the degree of clean-
liness of the home and the quality of the food that
household members consume. Household labor
need not be viewed as purely a task of allocation
between spouses or between private production
and purchased commodities. Rather, households
are also making trade-offs between the amount
of domestic production and the amount of other
items the household values, including leisure
time and consumption goods.
Buying Out and Opting Out
The relationship between wives’ earnings and
their time in housework is both statistically
significant and practically large. Using data
from the National Survey of Families and
Households (NSFH), Gupta (2006) found that,
compared with wives in the lowest quartile
of the earnings distribution, those in the top
quartile spent 13 fewer hours per week in
housework, which implies a 40% reduction.
Among couples in which both spouses worked
full time, wives in the second quartile of the
earnings distribution spent 26 hours per week in
housework, compared with 18 hours for women
in the highest quartile, a 30% reduction. Thus,
the relationship is not entirely due to differences
in labor market work by high- and low-earning
wives.
Households face decisions about both the
use of their members’ time and the ways to
spend available financial resources. Domestic
production, such as meals and a clean home
and clothes, can be created either directly,
through the time inputs of household members,
or indirectly, using the financial rewards from
market work to purchase the services of others.
If wives’ earnings are negatively related to
their housework hours, this may be because
earnings are negatively correlated with the total
amount of household production or because
they are positively correlated with the fraction
of domestic production that is outsourced or
allocated to other household members, or both.
The buying-out explanation for the negative
relationship between wives’ earnings and their
housework hours suggests that wives’ earnings
give them the purchasing power to buy market
substitutes for their own household labor. This
explanation focuses on the positive correlation
between wives’ earnings and the fraction of
domestic production that is outsourced. The
assumption that higher income households use
their financial resources to purchase market
substitutes that allow household members to
reduce their own time in housework is frequently
given as a reason to control for household income
in models of individuals’ time in housework
(e.g., Bittman, England, Sayer, Folbre, &
Matheson, 2003; Brines, 1994; Evertsson &
Nermo, 2004). The buying-out hypothesis is
also invoked in recent studies that recognize the
distinct effects of husbands’ and wives’ earnings
on wives’ housework time (Gupta, 2006, 2007;
Gupta & Ash, 2008).
The buying-out hypothesis is appealing
in part because it draws on a standard
economic model of consumption: Conditional
on the amount of time spent in the labor
force, wives with higher earnings have greater
financial resources to outsource domestic labor,
thereby ‘‘purchasing’’ additional leisure time for
themselves. Assuming that wives enjoy leisure
more than housework and again conditioning on
time in paid work, wives with greater earnings
should devote less time to housework and
more to leisure. If wives use their earnings
to buy out of time in household labor, we
would expect that household expenditures on
market substitutes for household labor rise with
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household income, as high-income households
have greater financial resources to purchase
the wife’s leisure time. This does not imply
that there are no constraints on households that
prevent them from outsourcing household labor,
merely that, all else equal, households with more
financial resources are better able to overcome
those constraints and reduce the wife’s time in
household labor than are households with fewer
financial resources.
Furthermore, the wife is likely to value
her own leisure time more highly than
her husband does. Even if spouses pool
their incomes, existing evidence indicates that
spending on goods that wives value or are
within wives’ sphere of traditional responsibility
rises more quickly with wives’ earnings than
with husbands’ (Phipps & Burton, 1998). As
a result, the buying-out hypothesis predicts
that expenditures on market substitutes for
wives’ household-labor time rise more quickly
with wives’ earnings than with husbands’.
As expected, couples’ spending on market
substitutes for housework women typically
perform, including child-care services and
cleaning services, have been found to have
a stronger positive association with wives’
earnings than with husbands’ (Cohen, 1998;
Oropesa, 1993; Phipps & Burton; Soberon-
Ferrer & Dardis, 1991), although some studies
have found that dining out responds equally
strongly to husbands’ and wives’ earnings
(Cohen; Oropesa). This is also consistent with
past evidence that wives’ time in housework
falls more rapidly with their own earnings than
with the earnings of their husbands (Gupta,
2006, 2007; Gupta & Ash, 2008; Killewald &
Gough, 2010).
If use of market substitutes is an important
mechanism by which wives reduce their time
in household labor as their earnings rise,
use of market substitutes should be strongly
negatively related to wives’ time in housework.
Furthermore, if the use of market substitutes
fully explains the negative relationship between
wives’ earnings and their housework hours, then
models of wives’ housework time that include a
measure of households’ use of market substitutes
should show no remaining association between
wives’ earnings and their time in housework. In
other words, the link between wives’ earnings
and their time in housework is entirely indirect,
as it operates through increased expenditures on
market substitutes.
Buying out, however, is not the only possible
source of the negative relationship between
wives’ earnings and their housework hours.
It is possible that housework hours are lower
for wives with higher earnings because the
average level of domestic production in their
households is lower. This may occur for two
reasons: opting out and selection. Wives may
respond to earnings increases by opting out of
housework, forgoing time in household labor
without purchasing a market substitute. Wives
with higher earnings may have a preference for
lower levels of domestic production because the
rewards for high levels of domestic production
are not as great for them. High-earning wives
may face less social pressure to perform
the traditionally female tasks of household
production, as has sometimes been suggested
(Gupta, 2006, 2007; Gupta & Ash, 2008). All
women may feel pressure to perform housework
as a way to ‘‘do’’ gender and to express affection
for household members (Berk, 1985; DeVault,
1991; Hochschild, 1989; West & Zimmerman,
1987), but that pressure may not operate with
equal force on all women. High-earning women
may be particularly likely to derive more
personal satisfaction and social status from
their labor-market roles, which makes the status
ascribed for performing traditional household
production less important.
Furthermore, the effort required to procure
adequate, trustworthy substitutes for wives’
time in household labor, as well as reluctance
to trust service providers (especially when
their employers do not easily observe their
behavior) may reduce households’ desire to
outsource many aspects of market production
(de Ruijter, van der Lippe, & Raub, 2003).
Therefore, households that choose to reduce
wives’ time in housework still may not be
willing to bear the financial and nonfinancial
costs of purchasing market substitutes and may
choose instead to reduce household production.
If wives are both opting out and buying out in
response to earnings increases, expenditures on
market substitutes will only partially mediate the
earnings – housework relationship, and models
that include a control for expenditures on market
substitutes will continue to show a residual
association between wives’ earnings and their
housework time.
It is also possible that the observed negative
relationship between wives’ earnings and their
time in housework is entirely spurious, as a
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result of differences among women in taste
for housework or domestic production that are
correlated with, but not caused by, differences
in earnings. In this case, too, we would expect
to see lower levels of domestic production and
less time spent in housework for wives with
higher earnings, and controlling for expenditures
on market substitutes would not eliminate the
earnings – housework relationship.
There is some evidence that use of market
substitutes may reduce women’s time in
housework. Van der Lippe, Tijdens, and de
Ruijter (2004), using data from the Dutch
National Time Budget survey, found that
frequency of takeout meals is associated with
less time cooking for both men and women and
that use of cleaning services reduces women’s
time cleaning. Similarly, Bittman, Rice, and
Wajcman (2004), using the Australian 1997
Time Use Survey, found that having hired
someone to clean the home in the previous
2 weeks was associated with significantly less
total time in housework for women, although
the number of times restaurant or takeout meals
were purchased over the same period was not.
Nonetheless, neither study tested whether the
use of these market substitutes explained the
negative association between women’s earnings
and their housework time.
METHOD
The sample was drawn from the Health
and Retirement Study (HRS) (Health and
Retirement Study; RAND HRS Data, Version
J). The Consumption and Activities Mail
Survey (CAMS), which in each wave included
a subsample of households from the HRS
sample, asked individuals about their own time
in housework and household expenditures on
various items. The 2003, 2005, 2007, and
2009 waves of CAMS were merged with the
HRS Core surveys of 2002, 2004, 2006, and
2008. In the 2005 – 2009 waves of CAMS,
the spouses of primary respondents were asked
to complete a shorter interview that included
measures of the respondent’s time use but did
not repeat the household expenditure measures.
In those cases, I imputed to both spouses
the level of household expenditure that the
primary household respondent reported. For
the periods considered here, the HRS is a
representative sample of the U.S. population
older than age 50, although the sample
included younger spouses as well. This article
highlights the experiences of a relatively
understudied group: mature couples, typically
living without young children in the household,
but before retirement. As the population ages,
understanding the experiences of this population
becomes increasingly valuable.
In the analyses that follow, the dependent
variables are wives’ self-reported time in meal
preparation and cleanup (cooking) and cleaning
house, washing, ironing, and mending (cleaning)
in the week before the survey. Together, these
tasks—cooking, doing dishes, ironing, washing,
and cleaning house—account for more than
70% of women’s time in noncare household
activities, including for women aged 45 – 64
(Krantz-Kent, 2009).
Measuring Substitution
Before I discuss the measure of market
substitutes employed here, it is useful to think
about what such a measure would ideally
capture. By ‘‘market substitutes,’’ I mean any
good or service that an individual purchases
to increase household production, without
performing household labor herself. Purchasing
takeout food, hiring someone to clean the home
or mow the lawn, or sending shirts to a laundry
are all examples of using market substitutes,
sometimes also referred to as outsourcing.
To test the extent to which wives substitute
purchased services for their own time in
housework, it would be ideal to determine the
amount of wives’ own time that the purchased
goods replace. For example, if a wife hires a
domestic cleaner, how many hours would the
wife have spent to accomplish the work the
cleaner did?
There is not, of course, such an ideal measure.
Instead, households’ expenditures on dining out
(cooking) and housekeeping or laundry services
(cleaning) are here considered expenditures on
market substitutes for women’s housework time.
This is consistent with existing research (Cohen,
1998; de Ruijter et al., 2005; Oropesa, 1993;
Treas & de Ruijter, 2008), although spending on
laundry services is sometimes excluded (Cohen;
Oropesa).
In CAMS, individuals were asked to report
their expenditures on ‘‘Housekeeping, dry
cleaning and laundry services: hiring costs
for housekeeping or home cleaning, and
amount spent at dry cleaners or laundries’’
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and ‘‘Dining and/or drinking out: items in
restaurants, cafes, and diners, including take-out
food.’’ This measure is not without limitations.
Expenditures in these areas may increase without
reducing wives’ housework time. For example,
consuming alcoholic beverages in restaurants
rather than at home would register as increased
spending on food away from home but would
be a poor measure of money spent reducing
wives’ time cooking. Likewise, a household
may spend more money on laundry services
simply because it has purchased more clothes
that require dry cleaning.
In addition, particularly for food, variation
in spending on market substitutes may reflect
variation in the quality of services purchased
rather than the amount of the wife’s time
that is replaced. Alternatively, wives’ greater
earnings may lead to greater tolerance of food
that is purchased but ultimately goes uneaten
by household members. These effects introduce
measurement error into the substitution measure,
which will lead to a downward bias in the
estimated relationship between the use of market
substitutes and wives’ housework time.
To the extent that increasing expenditures
on market substitutes reflect quality increases
and tolerance for wastage, a similar effect
should also lead to increased spending on
groceries and, to a lesser extent, cleaning
supplies, which are complements to rather than
substitutes for wives’ housework time. CAMS
also asked individuals about expenditures on
‘‘Housekeeping supplies: cleaning and laundry
products’’ and ‘‘Food and beverages: food and
drinks, including alcoholic, that you buy in
grocery or other stores.’’ To capture more
accurately the extent of substitution for the
wife’s housework, a measure of the share of
the household’s expenditures in the domain of
cooking or cleaning that is spent on market
substitutes rather than on complements was
constructed. This is given as follows: share =
100 × (spending on substitutes)/(spending on
substitutes + spending on complements).
Brines’s (1994) measure of spending on
restaurant meals relative to spending on food
prepared at home is similar in spirit. It is
expected that this measure is more strongly
related to wives’ housework time than is the
absolute level of expenditures on substitutes, as
it more strongly indicates the extent to which
market substitutes, rather than complements,
are used. Nonetheless, the measure is still not
perfect. For example, if wives choose to purchase
prepared foods that are more expensive than raw
ingredients but require relatively less time to
cook, this inflates expenditures on groceries but
in fact indicates greater use of market substitutes.
Model Specification
The analytic technique was ordinary least
squares (OLS). Wives’ hours spent cooking
and cleaning in the previous week were the
dependent variables. Wives’ annual earnings in
the calendar year before the HRS survey was
the primary independent variable. Husbands’
earnings (also in the calendar year before the
HRS survey), the usual weekly labor market
hours of each spouse in main and secondary
jobs at the time of the HRS survey, and
dummy variables for whether the wife is
African American and whether each spouse
has a bachelor’s degree were included as
covariates. Because race, education, and labor-
force participation are correlated with household
expenditures on market substitutes and with
housework time (Baxter, Hewitt, & Haynes,
2008; Bellante & Foster, 1984; Cohen, 1998; de
Ruijter et al., 2005; Pittman & Blanchard, 1996;
Sanchez & Thomson, 1997; South & Spitze,
1994) but are also associated with earnings,
failure to control for those variables would risk
confounding their effects on expenditures and
housework time with those of earnings.
Two measures were used to adjust for
differences across households in the demands
for domestic production from people and space:
the number of rooms in the family’s home and
a dummy variable set to 1 if members of the
household include anyone other than the couple.
A measure of the wife’s employment history
and the number of children ever born to the wife
were included as indicators of her relative taste
for home production as opposed to market work.
Furthermore, a wife’s employment and fertility
history may affect the household’s current
division of labor, net of current employment
hours, if household roles negotiated earlier in
the marriage shape her own and her husband’s
expectations of behavior later in life. The
employment history measure was constructed
by dividing the wife’s years of employment
to date by the difference between her present
age and 14. This approximates the share of the
wife’s adult life that she has spent employed,
although it is a coarse measure and subject
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to measurement error in respondents’ reported
work history.
Of the 12,052 observations of women from
CAMS, 237 (2.0%) were excluded because
their information could not be matched to
HRS reports from the previous calendar year.
To focus the analysis on married, working-
age couples, women whose marital status was
something other than married were excluded
(5,513 observations, 45.7%), as were couples
in which either spouse was older than age 65
(4,084 observations, 33.9%). Couples in which
either spouse was not in the labor force at the
time of the HRS survey or reported no earnings
in the previous calendar year were excluded
from the analysis (1,374 observations, 11.4%).
This restricts the focus of the analysis to dual-
earner couples. Retired couples were excluded
because their earnings are a poor measure of their
financial resources. Household sample weights
of 0 led to the exclusion of 11 observations
(0.09%). An additional 11 observations (0.09%)
were excluded because they were missing data
on one of the variables used to define the sample:
marital status or age, earnings, or retirement
status of either spouse.
After excluding couples who did not meet
the age or employment criteria, 822 couple-year
observations remained in the sample. Of those,
12 observations (1.5% of the remaining sample),
were removed because of reporting no expendi-
ture at all in the domains of either cooking or
cleaning, suggesting that the couples have some
other means of household production that direct
spending on household goods or services does
not capture. Missing values on the dependent
variable—the wife’s time in housework—led to
a loss of 14 observations, or 1.7% of the remain-
ing sample. The final analytic sample included
796 observations from 449 wives.
In the analytic sample, 2.1% of the obser-
vations were missing data on the usual hours
spent in paid work by the husband, and 2.3%
were missing this information for the wife. The
number of rooms in the house was missing for
7.2% of the sample and the number of children
ever born was missing for 0.1% of the sample.
Last, 5.6% of the sample was missing data on
one of the expenditure variables related to clean-
ing, and 5.1% was missing data on one of the
cooking expenditure variables. For each of these
variables, an indicator variable was created that
was set to 1 if the observation was missing data
on this covariate. The indicator for missing data
was included in any model that includes the
associated covariate.
The HRS household-level weights, normal-
ized to average one in each year in the full sample
of HRS households in each wave, were used to
weight the sample in all analyses. Because wives
may be represented in multiple waves, all analy-
ses clustered the standard errors at the individual
level. The top 5% of both time-use and financial
variables were recoded to the 95th percentile,
as were the variables for the number of rooms
in the home and the number of children ever
born. To adjust for inflation during the period,
financial variables were scaled to 2009 dollars.
RESULTS
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the
sample. The mean annual earnings were $43,111
for wives and $68,352 for husbands. Husbands
also spent somewhat more time in the labor mar-
ket—an average of 44.9 hours per week, com-
pared with 38.0 hours for wives. Thus, in this
sample of dual-earner couples, husbands both
substantially outearned their wives and were
more engaged in the labor market. A bachelor’s
degree was held by 36% of wives and 40%
of husbands. African Americans comprised 4%
of the sample. Couples had an average of 7.2
rooms in their homes, and 44% of couples lived
with at least one other resident. On average,
wives had spent 73% of their years since age 14
in the labor market and had given birth to 2.2
children. Wives were 54.1 years old on average,
compared with 56.8 years old for husbands.
Wives spent an average of 6.6 hours per week
cooking and 8.0 hours per week cleaning and
doing laundry. Almost all households reported
some spending on groceries, cleaning supplies,
and dining out: More than 97% of the sample
households reported some expenditure on each
of those items. By contrast, only 56% of house-
holds reported any spending on house-cleaning
or laundry services in the previous year. Among
those who buy such goods or services, mean
monthly expenditures were $66 for laundry and
housecleaning services, $35 for cleaning and
laundry supplies, $217 for dining out, and $485
for groceries.
Multivariate Results
Table 2 presents two models of wives’ time in
household labor. Model 2 is identical to Model 1,
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Table 1. Spouses’ Characteristics: Descriptive Statistics
(N = 796)
Variables M SD
Wife’s annual earnings $43,111.17 $31,828.80
Husband’s annual earnings $68,351.66 $43,050.04











Residents other than coupled 0.44 0.50
Rooms in the home 7.23 1.86
Share of wife’s adult years
employed
0.73 0.20
Number of children ever born
to wife
2.16 1.31
Wife’s age 54.05 4.91
Husband’s age 56.81 4.51
Wife’s weekly hours cooking 6.62 4.29















aWife has bachelor’s degree: 0 = no; 1 = yes. bHusband
has bachelor’s degree: 0 = no; 1 = yes. cWife is African
American: 0 = no; 1 = yes. dResidents other than couple:
0 = no; 1 = yes.
except that it also includes the measure of the
household’s level of use of market substitutes.
The reduction in the size of the coefficient on
wives’ earnings between Model 1 and Model
2 indicates the extent to which greater use of
market substitutes in households in which wives
have higher earnings explains the relationship
between wives’ earnings and their time in
housework.
In Model 1, wives’ earnings were significantly
negatively associated with their time in both
cooking and cleaning, consistent with existing
evidence. For each $10,000 increase in a wife’s
annual earnings, her weekly time in cleaning was
predicted to be 0.21 hours (13 minutes) lower,
and her weekly time cooking was predicted to be
0.19 hours (11 minutes) lower. Consistent with
past research, in models of wives’ time in both
cleaning and cooking, it was possible to reject the
null hypothesis that the coefficients on husbands’
and wives’ earnings are equal, F(1,448) = 7.49,
p < 0.01, and F(1,448) = 8.65, p < 0.01, and
in fact husbands’ earnings were positively and
not significantly associated with wives’ time
both cooking and cleaning. This suggests that
increased husbands’ earnings do not translate
into less housework for wives.
Model 2, of Table 2, presents the results from
the models that include the measure of the
household’s use of market substitutes. For both
cooking and cleaning, wives’ housework time
was predicted to be lower when their households
made greater use of market substitutes, but
the relationship was weak and only marginally
significant in the model of time cleaning. An
increase of 1 percentage point in a household’s
reliance on market substitutes was associated
with a predicted decline of 0.01 hours (1
minute) in a wife’s weekly time cleaning and
of 0.02 hours (1 minute) in her weekly time
cooking. Even considerable changes in the use
of market substitutes were therefore associated
with small changes in wives’ housework time.
Controlling for use of market substitutes
reduces the negative association between wives’
earnings and their time spent in housework, but
the reduction was moderate in both models: 12%
in the model of time spent cleaning and 2% in
the model of time spent cooking. The greater
role of market substitutes in mediating the
cleaning – earnings relationship as compared to
the cooking – earnings relationship is consistent
with the results of models of households’
expenditures on market substitutes, which
showed that wives’ earnings were positively and
significantly associated with their reliance on
substitutes for wives’ time cleaning but not with
reliance on substitutes for wives’ time cooking
(see Appendix Table 1 in the online material
associated with this article).
After controlling for the use of market
substitutes, wives’ earnings and the level of use
of substitutes were the only significant predictors
in the model of wives’ time cooking, and the
model explained only 7% of the variation in
wives’ time cooking. A larger number of control
variables were significant in the model of wives’
time cleaning, which explained 16% of the
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variation in wives’ time cleaning, after including
the measure of use of market substitutes. Wives
with bachelor’s degrees spent, on average, 2.1
fewer hours per week cleaning than other wives,
even after including controls for earnings, labor-
force hours, and use of market substitutes. The
number of children ever born was positively
and significantly associated with wives’ time
cleaning, as expected. Each additional child born
to the wife was associated with a predicted
increase of 0.4 hours per week in her time
cleaning, net of other controls. Each additional
room in the house was associated with a
predicted decline of 0.3 hours per week in the
wife’s time cleaning, contrary to expectations.
A possibility for this counterintuitive finding is
that larger homes are less cluttered and therefore
easier to clean. Neither the share of the wife’s
adult life spent working nor the presence of
residents other than the couple in the household
was significantly associated with the wife’s
housework time.
Husbands’ Housework
The main results may be limited by their neglect
of husbands’ time in housework. First, it is
possible that wives’ earnings enable them to
negotiate greater time in housework by their
husbands. If this is the case, including husbands’
housework hours in the model of wives’ time
use should reduce the negative relationship
between wives’ earnings and their time spent
on housework. In addition, increased spending
on substitutes may be used to reduce husbands’
housework time, rather than wives’, thus leading
to a weak association between households’ use of
market substitutes and wives’ housework time.
To test these hypotheses, I used the subset
of 362 wives (n = 609) from the 2005 – 2009
CAMS for whom husbands’ housework time
was also available. The husbands in this
subsample reported spending an average of
3.1 hours per week cleaning and 3.0 hours per
week cooking. Including husbands’ housework
hours as a covariate in the models of wives’
housework time revealed that husbands’ time
cleaning was positively and not significantly
associated with wives’ time cleaning, whereas
husbands’ time cooking was negatively and
marginally significantly associated with wives’
time cooking (full results available in Appendix
Table 2 in the online material associated
with this article). Nonetheless, controlling
for husbands’ time in housework slightly
increased the negative association between
wives’ earnings and their time both cooking and
cleaning. Therefore, although wives cooked less
when their husbands cooked more, the negative
association between wives’ earnings and their
time in housework does not appear to be due
to high-earning wives reallocating housework to
their husbands.
Second, I repeated the analysis of Table 2
using husbands’ time in housework as the
outcome (full results available in Appendix
Table 3 of the online material associated
with this article). If high-earning wives were
reallocating housework to husbands, we would
expect to see a positive association between
wives’ earnings and their husbands’ housework
time. If high-earning wives use their earnings
to purchase substitutes for their husbands’
housework time, we would expect to see a
negative relationship between wives’ earnings
and their husbands’ housework time, and we
would expect that the association would be
substantially reduced after controlling for the
household’s use of market substitutes. Wives’
earnings were not significantly associated with
husbands’ time cooking but were marginally
significantly and negatively associated with
husbands’ time cleaning once the measure
of use of market substitutes was included.
Despite this, the household’s use of market
substitutes was not significantly associated with
the husband’s time cooking or cleaning, and the
negative relationship between wives’ earnings
and their husbands’ cleaning time was slightly
greater after the measure of use of market
substitutes is added to the model. Thus, although
husbands married to high-earning wives spend
less time cleaning, this does not appear to be
because wives’ earnings are used to purchase
substitutes for their husbands’ household labor
time. Instead, it is possible that high-earning
wives not only opt out of housework themselves
but also allow their husbands to do so.
Alternative Specifications
This section considers various possible sources
of heterogeneity that may be associated with
both wives’ earnings and their time in house-
hold labor, as well as alternative specifications
of several independent variables. Under each
alternative specification, the models presented
in Table 2 were repeated to test whether the
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inclusion of the additional variables alters the
main conclusions. Spouses’ ages, whether either
spouse is younger than age 50, whether either
spouse is in poor health, household income other
than the earnings of spouses, and year of the
report were all tested as possible omitted vari-
ables. The fraction of the earnings – cleaning
relationship explained by the inclusion of
the market substitute measure ranged from
11% to 16%, and from 1% and 3% for the
earnings – cooking relationship. The results are
therefore quite similar to those in the main
models.
Alternative specifications of the finan-
cial variables were also considered. First,
I used absolute rather than relative expen-
ditures on market substitutes in the time-
use models but found that the inclusion of
those variables reduced the magnitude of the
earnings – cleaning relationship by only 4% and
the earnings – cooking relationship by less than
1%, and the level of expenditure was not a
significant predictor of time in either cleaning
or cooking. Second, because spouses’ wages
rather than earnings determine the opportunity
cost of each hour of housework, I repeated the
models replacing spouses’ earnings with their
hourly wage. Wives’ wages were negatively
and marginally significantly related to their
time cleaning, and the use of market substitutes
explained 8% of the relationship. Wives’ wages
were positively and not significantly related to
their time cooking. Third, I included a linear
measure of the share of the couple’s earnings
that the wife earns, because spouses’ bargain-
ing positions may affect both their division of
household labor and their expenditure decisions.
The relative earnings measure was not signif-
icant in any of the models. It is also possible
that spouses’ relative earnings may be nonlin-
early related to their time in housework (Bittman
et al. 2003; Brines 1994), but when I added a
quadratic term for spouses’ relative earnings to
the linear term, neither term was significant, nor
were they jointly significant.
DISCUSSION
The results presented here go beyond existing
work by explicitly considering the relationships
among wives’ earnings, household expenditures
on market substitutes for wives’ time in
household labor, and wives’ housework time.
Household expenditures on domestic substitutes
were negatively related to wives’ time in
household labor, although the association is far
weaker than might be supposed. The inclusion
of measures of the use of market substitutes
in models of wives’ time in household labor
explained 12% of the negative association
between wives’ time in cleaning and their
earnings and 2% of the relationship between
wives’ time in cooking and their earnings.
Throughout, I found stronger associations in
the domain of cleaning than cooking. The model
explained a greater share of the variation in
wives’ time cleaning than in their time cooking,
and the inclusion of the measure of use of mar-
ket substitutes reduced the cleaning – earnings
association more than the cooking – earnings
association. A reason for this may be that clean-
ing is a more uniformly undesirable activity,
whereas some forms of cooking are enjoyable
for at least some wives, so wives are more likely
to use their earnings to outsource cleaning. Fur-
thermore, dining out is a recreational activity
for spouses, as well as a market substitute for
wives’ time cooking (Cohen, 1998; Oropesa,
1993). At a minimum, the results suggest that it
may be inappropriate to treat women’s time in
household labor as homogenous.
This study has several limitations. First,
the sample size is small, which limits the
power of the statistical tests. Second, although
the analyses presented suggest that buying
out is not the only explanation for the
negative relationship between wives’ earnings
and their time in housework, they do not
distinguish between opting out and unobserved
heterogeneity among wives as the source of the
residual earnings – housework association, net of
use of market substitutes. As the primary focus of
this analysis was to call into question the power
of the buying-out hypothesis, this ambiguity
does not threaten the main conclusion. More
extensive panel data on earnings, housework
time and use of market substitutes would
provide an even richer test of the source of
the earnings – housework relationship.
The measures available also limit analyses.
First, housework hours and household expen-
ditures were measured in the calendar year
following the collection of information on
spouses’ earnings, labor-force hours, and house-
hold composition, so the measures are not con-
temporaneous. Second, the available measure
of substitution is limited. Although cooking,
cleaning, and laundry constitute a substantial
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share of women’s noncare housework time, the
analyses did not include all forms of household
labor. In addition, not all household expendi-
tures intended to reduce wives’ housework time
are included in the measure of expenditures on
market substitutes. For example, purchases of
labor-saving devices have the potential to reduce
wives’ household labor time, although the evi-
dence of their effectiveness in this regard is
mixed (Bittman et al., 2004; van der Lippe et al.,
2004). Furthermore, among the types of expen-
ditures considered, households may report their
expenditures with error and, as discussed earlier,
individuals report the dollar amount spent on
goods rather than the goods’ capacity to reduce
household labor time. Such measurement error
may partially explain the low predictive power
of use of market substitutes in models of wives’
housework time. If this is true, it minimally
suggests that the documented positive relation-
ship between wives’ earnings and household
expenditures on domestic services and restau-
rant meals cannot be interpreted as evidence that
wives are using those goods to substitute for
their own time in housework.
The extent to which the findings presented
here generalize to younger samples of women
is unknown. Younger women, particularly those
with children in the household, may experience
stronger time pressure that motivates them to use
increased earnings to buy some relief in terms of
household work. In addition to age differences,
cohort differences may exist. Women born in
later birth cohorts may be more willing to
outsource household labor when they possess
the financial resources to do so.
Despite the limitations, the results of this
study shed light on the degree to which use of
market substitutes explains variation in wives’
time in housework and, in particular, to what
extent increased use of market substitutes by
high-earning women explains the negative rela-
tionship between wives’ earnings and their
time in housework. For those hypothesizing
a role of market substitutes in mediating the
earnings – housework relationship, this provides
the first direct evidence in favor of the buying-
out story. At the same time, the results indicate
that the use of market substitutes is insufficient to
explain all, or even the majority, of the difference
between high-earning and low-earning wives’
time in household labor. Although it is not pos-
sible in this study to determine the reason for the
residual negative relationship between wives’
earnings and their housework time, the results
suggest that future research should recognize the
potential for wives to opt out of housework.
Furthermore, although wives’ time in house-
work falls as their earnings rise, the rate is
quite slow. A $10,000 increase in wives’ annual
earnings is associated with a predicted decline
in her combined cooking and cleaning time of
only 0.4 hours. The fact that wives do not make
extensive use of market substitutes to replace
their own time in household labor suggests that
nonfinancial concerns may motivate even high-
earning women to invest time in domestic pro-
duction, even though this reduces the amount of
time available for either market work or leisure.
Even high-earning wives may feel compelled
to perform at least some household labor them-
selves, whether because they or their families do
not perceive goods purchased in the market as
adequate substitutes for the wife’s own time or
because norms of doing gender suggest that it
is appropriate for women to spend some time in
housework, regardless of the economic logic of
this behavior. The idea that gendered norms of
behavior operate to give greater responsibility
for household labor to women than to men is
not new (Berk, 1985; Hochschild, 1989; West
& Zimmerman, 1987), but the results presented
here suggest that these norms may also operate
to keep domestic production in the household
rather than outsourcing it to market goods and
services.
This analysis suggests a need for more
research understanding how couples make deci-
sions about the level of household production
in their home. Just as the allocation of house-
work between spouses provides insight about
processes of household decision making and
gender inequality in the household, exploration
of the circumstances in which households reduce
domestic production provides insight about the
more general question of work – family trade-
offs that households make. Existing research has
too often treated the amount of housework to
be done as exogenous. As a result, we know
little about the social processes by which indi-
viduals and households construct definitions of
appropriate levels of domestic production and
make decisions about time in housework as
opposed to other activities or expenditures on
domestic production as opposed to other goods.
Households are not bound to produce a fixed
level of domestic production, with the only
decisions being how much to outsource and how
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to allocate the remaining labor among house-
hold members. Instead, households also make
decisions about how much they value domes-
tic production as opposed to other goods and
activities as well as which forms of household
production to retain and which to let go. Cer-
tainly, individuals do not have perfect freedom to
choose the level and kind of domestic production
they prefer, but it is equally erroneous to assume
that households have no control over such deci-
sions. An understanding of domestic production
decisions as households experience them must
therefore take seriously the full complement of
domestic production options that families and
individuals face, including the decision to opt
out of certain types of domestic production.
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